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On the morning of Sunday, March 13th, 2016 Professor 
Hilary Putnam died in Boston. He was almost 90 years old and 
was retired from teaching but not from intellectual activity. The 
news strongly shocked the philosophical community of his 
country and worldwide: not only for the breadth, depth and 
creativity of his work but particularly for his warm, encouraging 
and dialoguing personality. 
Since the 1960s his name has been at the center of several 
crucial problems of contemporary theoretical philosophy, 
mainly in the areas of philosophy of mind, philosophy of 
language and philosophy of science. To some extent we can say 
that Putnam has been especially known for five problems and 
philosophical arguments of great relevance and impact, as well 
as challenging mental experiments that accompanied several of 
them. Namely: his intervention on an important stretch of the 
controversy about the analytic and synthetic statements (1975); 
his article The meaning of ‘Meaning’ (1975) with which he consolidated his externalism in 
semantics and helped founding, along with Saul Kripke, the causal theory of reference; the 
argument against the identity of mental and physical states based on his hypothesis of the 
multiple realizability of the mental and the thesis of functionalism (1960; 1963); the famous 
thought experiment about “brains in a vat” (1981) and his thesis on “the collapse of the 
facts/value dichotomy” (1981; 2002). They all dealt with crucial problems of theoretical 
philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century and for a long time will be essential 
references in the treatment of these topics. Even traditional areas of philosophy, such as the 
theory of knowledge and metaphysics or philosophy of logic and mathematics, received his 
sharp contributions. 
He wrote approximately fifteen books (some of them compilations of series of lectures) 
and around two hundreds articles, being the main ones collected in three volumes of his 
Philosophical Papers (1975a; 175b; 1983), although many of his articles remain outside this list. He 
has also referred to issues related to history of philosophy, especially the thought of 
Wittgenstein, pragmatism and some Jewish thinkers. In addition to the breadth of his interests, 
Putnam was characterized by the rigor with which he went back on his own conceptions which 
led him to change the position of some of his basic thesis more than once. Different stages have 
been defined in the evolution of his thought: metaphysical realism, internal realism and finally 
direct or natural realism. Also, his famous functionalism in philosophy of the mind even 
received criticism from Putnam himself. 
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Putnam studied mathematics and philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania and 
then philosophy at Harvard University and the University of California, where he received his 
doctorate in 1951 with a thesis titled The meaning of the concept of probability applied to infinite 
sequences under the supervision of Hans Reichenbach and under the decisive influence of 
Rudolf Carnap. After completing his doctorate, he taught at Northwestern University, 
Princeton University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In 1965 he 
transferred to Harvard University where he remained until his retirement in 2000. In the 1960s 
and early 70s he had an active participation in the Civil Rights Movement and demonstrating 
against the American military intervention in Vietnam. In 1963 he promoted at MIT an 
association of teachers and students against the war. He later moderated his political 
participation but never abandoned his belief that academics must make a strong ethical 
commitment to social problems. This commitment is manifested in many features of his work, 
but especially in How not to solve ethical problems (1983) and Education for democracy (1993). 
Given the breadth of his work, it is obviously impossible to give a minimally 
representative picture of Putnam´s thought in this note, however we believe it may be 
enlightening to review some of the fundamental problems and arguments in his book Reason, 
truth and history (1981), a work that somehow tried to be an instance of synthesis of several of 
his basic concepts. 
From the start Putnam states that the basic purpose of the book is to “break the strangle 
hold” that certain dichotomies exert on the thinking of both philosophers and laymen; the main 
one is the dichotomy between objectivist and subjectivist conceptions of truth and reason. The 
task is divided into three stages: first, he exposes a conception of truth that aims to “unify the 
objective and subjective components” of truth (chapters 1 to 4); then the author applies that 
perspective to review and improve the dominant conceptions of rationality (Chapters 5 and 6) 
and finally, he applies his findings to the fact-value distinction and to the task of a rational 
grounding of ethical estimations (Chapters 7-9). 
In the first two chapters, the overall strategy of Putnam is to show the difficulties of 
externalism and of the so called “God’s eye” perspective, based on the analysis of the 
insurmountable difficulties of the classical theory of reference (reference-similarity) and of truth 
(true-copy). In chapter 3, Putnam points out that this issue has given rise to two basic 
philosophical perspectives. One of them, the oldest, is metaphysical realism; he calls this 
perspective as “externalist”, because somehow it believes that a view from God’s eye can be 
possible. The other, opened by Kant, he calls it “internalist”, on the basis that its central thesis is 
that “[...] what objects does the world consist of? It is a question that only makes sense to ask 
within a theory or description” (1981, p. 49). Putnam admits that there is more than one true 
description of the world. From his point of view: 
“Truth”, in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability, some sort 
of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those 
experiences are themselves represented in our belief system – and not a correspondence 
with a mind-independent or discourse-independent “states of affairs” (Putnam, 1981, p. 
49-50). 
 
According to Putnam, externalism lives beset by the problem of reference it cannot 
solve. Instead for the internalist the problem is solved because objects do not exist 
independently of conceptual schemes, but only since we cut the world into objects when 
entering certain categories and descriptive schemes. If, as claimed by internalism, “objects” 
themselves are as much made as discovered, as much products of our conceptual invention as 
of the “objective” factors in experience (Putnam, 1981, p. 54). 
“Objects” do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the world into 
objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description. Since the objects and the 
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signs are alike internal to the scheme of description, it is possible to say what matches what 
(Putnam, 1981, p. 52). 
 
Putnam is concerned about clarifying that, although internalism denies sense to the 
question of the relationship between our concepts and something totally uncontaminated by 
conceptualization, this should not lead to think that internalism is an “easy relativism” that 
argues that “anything goes”, that is to say that any conceptual scheme is as right as any other. 
The undesirable practical consequences of acts based on faulty conceptual schemes are 
eloquent. 
He defines the concepts of rationality and objectivity starting from the ideas mentioned 
above: “What makes a statement, or a whole system of statements – a theory or a conceptual 
scheme – rationally acceptable is, in large part, its coherence and fit [...] with one another and 
with more experiential beliefs” (Putnam, 1981, p. 54-55). 
At the same time, our conceptions of coherence and rational acceptability depend on our 
psychobiological characteristics and on our culture, and are not exempt from values. “They 
define a kind of objectivity, objectivity for us”(p. 55). Not an absolute objectivity and rationality 
that could only emanate from the rejected God´s Eye view. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to analyze the dominant conceptions of rationality in 
contemporary analytic philosophy: on the one hand, the positivist and criterial conceptions, and 
on the other, the concept of relativism and incommensurability. He is going to find both of 
them to be contradictory. To begin with, as it has already been pointed out, the verifiability 
criterion of logical positivism is self-refuting, because the criterion itself is neither analytic nor 
empirically testable. Putnam recalls this, but he adds that not only logical positivism falls into 
self-refutation, but all criterial’s conception of rationality does as well. According to him, also 
logical positivism, Wittgenstein and some of the philosophers of ordinary language shared this 
view. He argues that such conceptions fall into these neglected logical missteps because 
ultimately they disregard a transcendental argument, that “arguing about the nature of 
rationality [...] is an activity that necessarily presupposes a notion of rational justification” not 
only wider than positivist notion but “wider than any institutionalized criterial rationality” 
(1981, p. 113). 
On the other hand, according to him the relativistic conception, in its contemporary 
version, was introduced by Thomas Kuhn in The structure of scientific revolutions (1962), and 
retaken by Paul Feyerabend. After an extensive critique of the theory of incommensurability, 
Putnam points out the inconsistency of total relativism: if no view is more justified than any 
other, relativism and anti-relativism are equally correct. According to Putnam, it is Wittgenstein 
who completes this strategy against relativism. Wittgenstein's argument against private 
language shows that relativism cannot provide any criterion for distinguishing between being 
right and believing to be right. Still, relativism could make an attempt at the distinction by 
adopting the concept of truth as an idealization of rational acceptability. But this implies the 
admission of subjunctive conditionals that realistically interpreted by relativism would lead 
him to recognize certain types of absolute truths; and construed in an internalistic way, this 
would result nevertheless in assuming certain conditions of objective justification, which 
relativism is prohibited from by definition. In short, at the origin of all these difficulties of 
relativism it´s the fact that it “does not realize that the existence of some sort of objective 
rightness is a presupposition of thought itself” (1981, p. 124). For Putnam these inconsistencies 
in the two outlined epistemologies have been originated in the fact that both are the result – the 
first of the success, the second of the failure – of the scientific thinking (and logical thinking) 
ideal of rationality of the nineteenth century. None of them managed to find a conception of 
rationality without tying itself in various ways, to that model. 
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Having reached decisive chapter 6, Putnam attempts to apply his conception of 
knowledge and rationality to the problem of distinguishing facts from values, then proposing 
an outline of rational justification of estimations. At the beginning he rehearses, against the 
majority opinion, the thesis that the institutional and absolute distinction between factual 
judgments and value judgments (Hume-Moore-Weber) is at least very diffuse. The concept of 
truth is only specified having a certain criteria of rational acceptability and if we examine the 
idea of rational acceptability used in scientific activity, we will realize that there are certain 
values that guide it: they are values that go somehow beyond the merely cognitive. We prefer 
this type of representation because it “is part of our idea of human cognitive flourishing and 
therefore part of our idea of the total human flourishing or eudaimonía” (p. 138). 
It has been said – Putnam argues – that we must discard all discourse about justice or 
about the idea of good for being an unscientific discourse, but what does this mean so far as 
ethics does not conflict with science? Surely it is meant that there are terms that are not 
reducible to physical terms. However, he shows that not all the notions we use in describing the 
world are reducible to physical terms, and it is not unscientific; therefore, if the irreducibility of 
ethical terms to physical shows that values are projections, then so would colors, mathematical 
entities and the physical world itself. “But being a projection in this sense is not the same thing 
as being subjective” (1981, p. 147) or arbitrary. On the contrary, such statements have their 
conditions of objective justification when they allow us to describe the facts as they are to us, 
that is, as they are in a human world built by and for human practice. Another thing is not 
possible for us. Then, here we have a redefinition of the concept of objectivity consisting of 
clearly anthropocentric standards. 
Putnam has been particularly concerned with the claim that even certain minimum 
ethical statements could not be regarded as objectively valid. He was referring to statements 
such as: ‘A person who has a sense of human brotherhood is better than one that has not got it’ and ‘A 
person capable of thinking for himself about how to live is better than someone who has lost or never 
acquired such capacity’. The overall strategy to show the validity of these statements will be to 
show that ethic values are not separated from cognitive values and through them they are 
linked to our ideas of rationality and objectivity. As already mentioned, according to Putnam 
truth and objectivity depend on the criteria of idealized rational acceptability. At the same time, 
our conceptions of coherence and rational acceptability depend on our psychobiological 
characteristics and our cultural patterns, and are not exempt of values. As a result, what we 
accept as a fact, as objectivity and as rationality, is largely conditioned by our values, which 
ultimately depend on our idea of good. The distinction between the sphere of facts and values, 
which are now interdependent, is then diluted. This does not imply for Putnam to relapse on 
relativism because in spite of the fact that all knowledge and every assessment is culturally 
conditioned, he is going to point out that the knowledge that allows a better description of the 
world is more correct, adjusted to our cognitive values as a part of our idea of human 
flourishing, and the assessment that allows a better description of the social world adjusted to 
our basic moral values, as the other part of our idea of the human ideal.  
 Putnam does not fall in an unhistorical absolutism because he believes there are no 
canons of supra-historical rationality or invariant moral principles, but indeed only an evolving 
idea of cognitive and moral virtues as a guide. Thus, our author establishes a strong 
relationship between rationality and morality. Rationality appears conditioned by values, since 
cognitive schemes reflect purposes and interests and, in turn, morality is linked to a particular 
way of understanding the world and of dealing with it. “Any choice of conceptual scheme 
presupposes values, and the choice of a scheme for describing ordinary interpersonal relations 
and social facts [...] involves, among other things, one´s moral values” (1981, p. 215). 
Putnam shows that contemporary moral skepticism was derived from a modern notion 
of instrumental rationality, its basic core idea being that the choice of ends is neither rational 
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nor irrational and only the choice of means can be described in such terms, if they were or not 
suitable for the intended purposes. However, to begin with, this dichotomy loses its apparent 
solidity when we realize that it relies on a psychological theory (Bentham) today overly 
simplistic and static, that conceives purposes as given once and forever, without any possibility 
of evolution, a typical idea of an essentialist and conservative anthropology. However, if we 
open the alternative of conceiving the creation of new purposes, it will begin to be a place for its 
rational criticism. Putnam takes the parameters that Bernard Williams has proposed to base 
such criticism, namely: the possibility of reassessing the existential appeal of certain goals; the 
ability to consider alternatives and unperceived goals; the possibility of conceiving what would 
actually be to obtain those goals and new specifications thereof. 
Can we then demonstrate the irrationality of the instrumentally rational Nazi? Indeed; 
first of all, we can prove the irrationality of his goals. The irrationality of a goal can be 
demonstrated when its acceptance leads either to support it in failed arguments, false data or to 
accept an irrational alternative scheme to represent descriptive and moral facts. “A culture that 
repudiates ordinal moral notions [...] would lose the ability to describe interpersonal relations, 
social events and political events adequately and perspicuously” (1981, p. 212). 
That is to say, the descriptive background associated with a moral system does not allow 
to choose any value (e.g. Hold the need to eliminate a certain ethnic group) because that would 
contradict cognitive achievements. Besides, the evaluative background of the descriptive facts 
would not allow explaining the facts in any way (e.g. by falsifying evidence or altering certain 
inferential principles). From this revised conception of justification Putnam concludes that we 
are entitled to consider that some extreme evaluative inclinations are indeed unhealthy (and 
indeed all of us do it) as much as we do with some cognitive schemes. 
However, for Putnam this implies not a rejection of pluralism or an adherence to any 
kind of dogmatism or authoritarianism, as these are different conceptions of human flourishing. 
But believing in the multiplicity of ideals does not imply arguing that any idea of Eudaimonia is 
as valid as any other. It is remarkable how the conclusion that opposition to all forms of 
political or moral authoritarianism should not commit us to ethical skepticism and that the 
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